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HUMAN RIGHTSQUARTERLY

CulturalAbsolutismand the
Nostalgiafor Community
RhodaE. Howard
RELATIVISM
AS CULTURAL
ABSOLUTISM
I. CULTURAL
In recentyears the liberalapproachto human rightshas undergonea twofold assault,from both the rightand the left. Fromthe right,liberalhuman
rightsare attackedby a new version of communalismthat promotesthe
integrativeprotectionof the humanbeing in the communityas againstthe
sociallyalienatingeffectsof individualhumanrights.Fromthe left,liberalism
is attackedby a collectivistapproachto human rightsbased on notionsof
ascriptively-basedprivilegesor disadvantagesin society. Inthe international
debateson the relevanceof humanrights,righttraditionalismhas combined
with left collectivism; allegedly communitarianthird world societies are
consideredvictimsof an imperialistliberalagendaof humanrightsemanating
from the Western-dominatedUnited Nations.The concept of culturalrelativismis used by both traditionalistsand communitariansas a defense of
their"wayof life"againstthe individualismandalienationthatliberalhuman
rightsarethoughtto imply.Butthe relativismthatis implicitin sucharguments
is actuallya concept of culturalabsolutism.
Culturalabsolutismis a philosophicalpositionthatdeclaresa society's
cultureto be of supremeethical value. Itadvocatesethnocentricadherence
to one's own culturalnorms as an ethically correct attitudefor everyone
except loosely-defined"Westerners."It thus posits particularistculturesas
of moreethicalvalue thanany universalprincipleof justice. Inthe left-right/
North-Southdebate that permeatestoday's ideological exchanges, cultural
absolutistsspecifically argue that culture is of more value than the internationally-accepted(butWesternin origin)principleof human rights.
Humanrightsareconsideredin internationallawto be rightsheld equally
by every individualby virtueof his or her humanity,and for no otherreason.
Human rightsare non-derogableclaims againstboth society and the state
thatare not contingentupon performanceof specific duties.Thisarticlewill
HumanRightsQuarterly15 (1993) 315-338 o 1993 by TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress
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assumethatdefenseof universalhumanrightsis a worthwhileethicalposition
in the modernworld. In complex state societies, human rightsdefend individualsagainstpolitical abuse. Most individualswould preferfor themselves the protectionsthathumanrightsoffer,althoughthey mightnot agree
that othersshould have the same protections.
A systemof justicebasedon humanrightsis one particularsystem.There
can be othersystemsof justice not basedon humanrights.Ingeneral,social
justice can be definedas the means by which all membersof a society are
treatedin a fashionconsideredrespectfulof their culturallydefined social
station.Justiceconsistsof rulesof appropriatesocial behaviorand rulesof
fairnessthatmightnot containthe basic principlesof humanrights,namely
that rightsare individualand thateveryone, regardlessof status,is equally
endowed with them. But some culturalrelativistsargue that all culturallybound systems of social justice are human rightssystems no matterwhat
their substantivecontent or overarchingprinciples.In makingthis claim,
relativistsunderminethe actualmeaningof humanrightsand leave the door
open to severe abuses of individualsin the name of the rightsof the collectivityor the community.'
Because"humanrights"is an ideologicallyand politicallyloadedphrase
that has great moral cachet in contemporaryworld political debate, most
politicalelites find it in theirintereststo pretendto believe in humanrights.
Spokespersonsfora largenumberof societieswhose systemsof socialjustice
are quite explicitlynot based on human rights-that is, on the individual,
autonomouscapacityto make rightsclaims againstsociety and the statethereforecontendthatthey do indeed have humanrights:socialist,Muslim,
Hindu,or othervarietiesthereof.They claim thatsensitivityto the relativity
of culture will result in acknowledgementthat each culture has its own
indigenousconcept of humanrights.
Culturalrelativismis a method"wherebysocial and culturalphenomena
are perceived and described in termsof scientific detachmentor, ideally,
fromthe perspectiveof participantsin or adherentsof a given culture."2This
method of analysis evolved in the early twentieth century to counteract
Westerners'nineteenth-century
beliefthattheirown white, Christiansociety
was morallysuperiorto all others. Duringthe colonial period, belief in
Westernmoralsuperiorityjustifiedanthropologicalstudy of "primitive"or
"native"cultures,and anthropologistswho clearlyheld to visions of white
superiorityabettedWesternimperialconquest.Giventhe manyattemptsby
Westernpowersto destroyindigenoussocieties, culturalrelativismwas and
1. Thisdiscussionof social justice is frommy "Dignity,Communityand HumanRights,"in
HumanRightsin Cross-Cultural
Perspective:A Questfor Consensus,ed. AbdullahiA. AnNa'im(Philadelphia:Universityof PennsylvaniaPress,1992), 81-102.
2. DavidBidney,"CulturalRelativism,"
in International
Encyclopediaof the SocialSciences,
ed. David L.Sills (New York:Macmillan,1968), 3:543.
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remainsa valuable defense of indigenoussocieties against attackand destructionby colonialists,missionaries,and others.
Culturalrelativismis not only a method, it is also an ethical stance.
Relativismassumesthat there is no one culturewhose customsand beliefs
dominateall others in a moralsense. Butthis relativismis now sometimes
takento such an extremethatany practiceof an indigenoussociety can be
theoreticallydefended merely on the groundsthat it is a local "custom."
And outsiders'discussionsof local violationsof humanrightsare criticized
as unwarrantedideological interference.When taken to this absolutistextreme,the term"culturalrelativism"impliesthatall culturesare morallyor
ethicallyequal, that there should be no judgementsmade of theircomparative intrinsicworth.JackDonnellyrefersto this ethicalpositionas "radical"
culturalrelativism,which holdsthat"cultureis the sole sourceof the validity
of a moralrightor rule."3Radicalculturalrelativismcan be renamedcultural
absolutism.
Theabsolutistschool claims, in effect,thathumanrightsare not relevant
to culturesthatdo not share"Western"customs,norms,beliefs,and values.
Humanrightsare a notionculturallyspecificto the Westernworld. Different
societies have differentculturesthatare not comparable.All cultures,moreover, are morallyequal. Since culturesare not comparable,human rights
are not andshouldnot be universal,and no Westernerhasthe rightto discuss
waysthatotherculturescould orshouldreorienttheirethicalsystems.Human
rights,in a now famous phrase,are a "Westernconstructwith limitedapplicability."4
The absolutistargumentagainstuniversalhuman rightshas three separate aspects. First,the absolutistargumentconfuses the principleof universalitywith practice,which is clearly not universal.Universalismis untenable because in practice,humanrightsare not protectedworldwide.For
example, Pollis and Schwab, two leading relativistsin the international
human rightsdebate, noted in 1980 that human rightstook second place
to states' rights in many Africancountriesand in socialist societies; they
thereforeconcluded that what was not practicedwas not relevantin principle.5Thispositionconfusesthe immediateexistence of humanrightswith
their possible legal and practicalrelevance. A medical analogy illustrates
the illogical characterof this argument;one would not argue that lack of
access to healthcare in thirdworld or socialist societies means healthcare
is irrelevant.And in fact, the argumentagainstuniversalismusuallyis made
3. JackDonnelly,UniversalHumanRightsin Theoryand Practice(Ithaca:CornellUniversity
Press,1989), 109.
4. AdamantiaPollis and PeterSchwab,"HumanRights:A WesternConstructwith Limited
Applicability,"in Human Rights:Culturaland IdeologicalPerspectives,eds. Adamantia
Pollisand PeterSchwab(New York:Praeger,1980), 1-18.
5. Ibid.,11.
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with referenceto civil and political rights,not to economic rightssuch as
medical care. The fallacy of confusing practiceand principlepervadesa
recent volume presentinga political economy critiqueof human rightsin
Africa."[Florcountriesthathave knownno peace, stability,or progresssince
theircontactwiththe forcesof Westernimperialism,civil and politicalrights
have no meaning."6
Apparently,something that one lacks is not meaningful;one is not
capableof speculatingon whatthe qualityof one's life would be if one had
that which one lacked. But social movementsfor political change arise
precisely because people do envisage a life in which more of their rights
are protected.Internationalhuman rightsare a standardto which it would
notbe necessaryto devoteso mucheffortiftheywere alreadyfirmlyprotected
everywhere.Those who advocate humanrightsas a universalprincipledo
so preciselybecause rightsare not universallyrespected.To claim thatthat
which is not presentis irrelevantassumesthatthose who are denied rights
do not havethe intellectualcapacityto articulatetheirsufferingand to grasp
the fundamentalprinciplesof justicethat humanrightsimply.Such a claim
reinforcesthe stereotypeof the "native"as a non-thinking,primitivebeing
whose pain is partof the one-ness of his existence.7
The second absolutistargumentrefersnot to practicebut to principle.
Universalhuman rightsare untenablebecause in principle,human rights
arenota universalculturalideal.Thisargumentusuallyappliesto the content
of particularrightssuch as equalityfor women. "[T]hebelief that women
are entitled to equal status as citizens . . . is not universally accepted in

African,Islamicor Westernsocieties."8
But culturalabsolutistssimultaneouslyargue that human rightsare a
universalideal. The concept of rightsis universal,but the content (what,
substantively,are or oughtto be rights)variesamongdifferentsocieties. All
cultures,absolutistsclaim, have some idealsof humanrights,althoughthese
ideals may seem strangeto Westerneyes since they do not include norms
such as equalitythat are basic to the United Nations'humanrightsframework. Thus,for example, the Hindu caste system is proposedas a system
of humanrights."The fact that certaingroups [in India],the lower castes,
for example, the untouchables,are denied humanrightsin no way proves
6. JuliusO. Ihonvbere,"Underdevelopmentand Human RightsViolationsin Africa,"in
EmergingHumanRights:theAfricanPoliticalEconomyContext,eds. GeorgeW. Shepherd,
Jr.and MarkO. C. Anikpo(New York:GreenwoodPress,1990), 57.
7. ThusIsakDinesenin Outof Africa(New York:VintageBooks,1972 [1sted. 19371),278thestoicismof a "native"
whatsoever,romanticized
83, who withoutanyself-consciousness
of her acquaintanceas he awaited the death broughton by a beatingby his colonial
master.Ngugiwa Thiong'o,the Kenyannovelist,discussesDinesen'sperceptionsof natives
in his Detained:a Writer'sPrisonDiary(London:Heinemann,1981), 35-36.
8. AlisonDundesRenteln,"TheUnansweredChallengeof Relativismandthe Consequences
for HumanRights,"HumanRightsQuarterly7 (November1985): 534.
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that the society lacks a concept of human rights."9This approachargues
that all systems of social justice are systems of human rights. It is more
importantto give all systemsof justicethe ideologicallypurelabelof human
rightsthan to differentiateamong such systems and discover which ones
allocatesubstantiveand equal rightsand dignityto all individualspurelyon
the basis of their humanity,and which allocate only privilegesand duties
contingenton unequalsocial status.
The thirdabsolutistargumentis that universalismis untenablebecause
(it is argued implicitly)indigenous cultures supersede human rightsas a
social good. "[C]ulturalrelativism[absolutism]may be defined as the position accordingto which local culturaltraditions(includingreligious,political, and legal practices)properlydeterminethe existence and scope of
civil and political rightsenjoyed by individualsin a given society."'•This
is the keyto the absolutistperspective.Forabsolutists,cultureis the supreme
ethical value, more importantthan any other. Humanrights,in particular,
should not be promotedif their implementationmightresultin a change in
a particularculture.
Butculturalabsolutistsdo notfullyrejectuniversalistethicsas they claim
to do. Culturalabsolutistsactuallyposit one universalethical law, that
a) there are no universalmoralprinciples;
b) one ought to act in accordance with the principlesof one's own
group;and
c) (b) is a universalmoralprinciple."
This law carriesmore moralweight for absolutiststhan the law of universal
human rights,althoughit is itself a principlethat cannot be located in all
culturalsystems. If one were to look for it, one would probablyfind rather
that most culturesbelieve that theirown moralprinciplesought to be universal.
individual
cannotbutbe convincedthathis own wayof life is the most
[Tmhe

desirableone....

[D]espitechanges originatingfromwithin and without his

culturethathe recognizesas worthyof adoption,it becomesequallypatentto
him that, in the main, otherways than his own . . are less desirable.... .2

Thusthe logical positionthat most people embedded in theirown cultures
will take is:
9. Ibid.,527.
HumanRightsand CulturalRelativism,"
10. FernandoR.Teson,"International
Journal
Virginia
of International
Law,25 (Summer1985): 870.
11. Ibid.,888.
12. This is takenfromthe classic "Statementon HumanRights,"unsignedbut knownto be
new series,49 (Oct.-Dec. 1947):
writtenby MelvilleHerskovitz,AmericanAnthropologist,
540.
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a) there are universalmoralprinciples;
b) our own cultureembodies these principles;and
c) everyoneelse oughtto follow our principleseven if this meansabandoning his or her own culture.
Thus, circumcisedfight uncircumcised,Christiansand Muslimsslaughter
each other,vegetariansdespise meat-eaters,and so on all over the world.
It is precisely because of each society's tendency to think its own culture
the best that we need a basis for judgingsocial justice that is not culturebound.
Thethirdabsolutistargument,thatindigenousculturessupersedehuman
rightsas a moral good, is the majortheme of a book by Alison Dundes
Renteln,the mostrecentexemplarof the culturalabsolutistschool of human
rights.13Rentelnbelieves that the 1948 UniversalDeclarationof Human
Rightswas so heavilyinfluencedbyWesternthoughtas to haveno pertinence
to non-Westernsocieties; indeed, human rightsare an ethnocentricvalue
of Westerners.But simultaneously,she arguesthat in fact all societies do
have their own human rightsstandards.In order to avoid ethnocentrism,
she proposesthat the only universalhuman rightsstandardsbe those empiricallyshown to be universalculturalideals.Thusin practiceRentelndoes
not completely reject universality.But she arguesfor additive, ratherthan
ethical, universality:only a principleshown to be universalonce we have
looked for its presence or absence in all cultures is legitimate.The only
principlethat is universalon an ethicalbasisalone is thatall societies ought
to (ethnocentrically)
adhereto theirown culture.
Rentelnbelieves thatone can discoverhumanrights,or their"homeomorphicequivalent"'4in all societies. As an exampleof how to identifyher
universalhomeomorphicequivalents,she uses the internationallegal prohibition of genocide. She reviews anthropologicalstudies of retribution,
feuds, and vendettaswhich, she argues,show that there are culturalrules
of vengeance in most societies that limit the numberof deaths permitted.
This, Rentelncontends,is evidence of a universalstandardagainstgenocide
that is culturallyentrenched,not dependenton a Westernethical norm.
One can certainlyaccept Renteln'sview thatinternationalhumanrights
standardshave a betterchance of being put into practiceif they also reflect
culturalideals. This is a position that the Muslimlegal scholar Abdullahi
AhmedAn-Na'imalso espouses, in his searchfor Qur'anicjustificationsfor
equal rightsfor women, bettertreatmentfor religiousminorities,and the
end of the notionof jihad (holywar)as a basisfor relationsbetweenMuslim
13. AlisonDundesRenteln,International
HumanRights:UniversalismVersusRelativism(NewburyPark,CA:Sage, 1990).
14. Ibid.,11.
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and non-Muslimstates.'sButAn-Na'imhas been unableto find any internal
Muslimpreceptthat could be used to abolishthe hudud punishments(amputationof limbsfortheft)presentlyused in his nativeSudan.'6 Thisillustrates
the difficultyof limitingethicalprinciplesto thoseextantin particularcultural
traditions,ratherthan acknowledgingthe legitimacyof abstract,philosophical considerationof ethical questions that is transculturaland denies the
preemptiveclaim of culturesto a superiormoralstatus.
In the world of culturalabsolutism,ethical debate in universalistterms
is simplynot countenanced:particularist
culturesare all-encompassing.But
if culture is as all-encompassingas absolutistscontend, it ought to be impossible in practice for philosophers,lawyers, human rightsactivists, or
indeed ordinarycitizens within a society to transcendculture-boundedness
or to makeethicaljudgmentsof theirown customs.All we can do to promote
universalhumanrightsis to wait untilculturesevolve internally,but not in
reactionto the stimulusof thoughtfulhumanagency. This flies in the face
of all empiricalevidence. Despitethe culturalabsolutists'beliefthatabstract,
transculturalethical discussionsare impossible,all sortsof people insiston
holdingthem.Culturalabsolutiststhereuponmaintainthatthese discussions
may not be impossible,but they are unethical.
The Argentineanlegal scholar FernandoR. Teson refersto the idealization of cultureas elitist. He disputesthe positionthat
. . . countriesthatdo not springfroma Westerntraditionmaysomehowbe
excusedfromcomplyingwiththe international
lawof humanrights.Thiselitist
...
that
human
are
holds
for
rights good theWest,butnotformuchof
theory
the non-Western
world.[R]elativist
scholars... wishto respectthe
[absolutist]
autonomyof individualcultures.The resultis a vaguewarningagainst"ethnocentrism"
and well-intentioned
to tyrannical
proposalsthatare deferential
and
concerned
withhumansuffering.
Becausethe
governments insufficiently
consequence . . . is that certain nationalor ethnic groupsare somehow less

entitledthanotherstotheenjoyment
ofhumanrights,thetheoryisfundamentally
immoralandrepletewithracistovertones.17
Moraldiscourse,contendsTeson,is universalizable.18
Thusit is perfectly
legitimatefor a Westernerto advocateuniversalhumanrightsand to discuss
the possibilitiesfor their protectionworldwide. Human rights are about
protectionof people's lives, safety, and individualfreedom. They are a

15. AbdullahiAhmedAn-Na'im,TowardanIslamicReformation:
CivilLiberties,
HumanRights,
and International
Law(Syracuse:SyracuseUniversityPress,1990).
16. AbdullahiAhmedAn-Na'im,"Towarda Cross-Cultural
Approachto DefiningInternational
Standardsof HumanRights:the Meaningof Cruel,Inhuman,or DegradingTreatmentor
Punishment,"in Human Rightsin Cross-Cultural
Perspectives:A Quest for Consensus,
note 1 above, 36.
17. Teson,note 10 above, 895.
18. Ibid.,889.
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supremeuniversalvalue in the sense that most people, deprivedof these
protections,want to have them, regardlessof the culturein which they live.
"Unauthentic"thirdworld thinkerswho favor humanrightsshould not be
rejectedas betrayersof traditionalcultures.Withoutsuch "betrayal,"their
culturesmay very well stultifyin the handsof self-servingelites.
II. AN ABSOLUTISTDEFENSEOF A WHITECANADA

The absolutistposition maintainsthat human rightsare a Westerncultural
impositionon the restof the world. It posits a very crude understandingof
what the "West"is and how culture and politics interact.It ignoresthe
diversityof cultureswithin the West. It also confuses politicalphilosophies
with cultures, attributingone such philosophy, namely liberalism,to all
Westernsocieties and ignoringother Westernphilosophiessuch as communism,corporatism,and fascismthatdo not hold to humanrightsnorms.
Culturalistargumentsare usuallymade with respectto the formercolonized nationsof the world or to indigenouspeoples in settlerstates. But
to be consistent,culturalistargumentsshouldalso applyto large-scale,Western societies. All large-scalepoliticalunits have internalcultures,although
they maynot be identifiedas such because internalconflictsand expressions
of non-integrativeparticularistinterestswill be more obvious than in the
small-scale,homogeneouscommunitiesthatanthropologistshavetraditionally studied. If indigenousand thirdworld culturesare to be allowed the
complete play of their values, beliefs, norms, and customs regardlessof
whetheror not they conformto internationalhumanrightsstandards,then
the culturesof othersocieties should have the same privileges.Any society
should be permittedto retainits cultureregardlessof humanrightsconsiderations.If absolutistsrejectthis positionthen they are arguingthat some
cultures(in practice,indigenousthirdworldones) are more"absolute"than
others;that some are absolutelyworth preserving,whereas otherscan be
changed or destroyed.They thus reversethe culturalimperialismthatthey
contendcharacterizesthe universalhumanrightsdocuments,givinggreater
weight to non-Westernthan to Westernethical beliefs.
Ifcultureis a preemptivesocial good, with a highermoralstandingthan
human rights,and if the only universalrule is that one ought to act in
accordancewiththe principlesof one's own group,thenno culturalabsolutist
should find shockingthe following argumentabout the natureof Canadian
society.
Canadais a whiteProtestant
societyof British
origin(exceptQuebec).Itsvalues
arehonesty,hardwork,attachment
to family,socialrectitude,
and loyaltyto
the monarchy.
Canadians
area quietpeople,notgivento displaysof emotion
or unbridledfestivities.They are sexuallyrestrained.
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controlled
so thatthesevalues
to Canadamustbe verycarefully
Immigration
socialvalues
are notdestroyed.Peopleof Slavicor Latinoriginhavedifferent
tend
to
be
noisier
and
less
thanNorthern
andhave
restrained,
Europeans-they
of questionable
ethics;they
largerfamilies.Jewsare knownto be merchants
to the landor to the monarchy.
TheChinese
arenotcapableof realattachment
with ours
and Japaneseare good workersbut theircultureis incompatible
becausetheyareneitherBritishnorwhite,so theymustnotbe allowedto stay
inCanadaexcepton short-term
workpermits.NodecentCanadian
wouldwant
to live in the samecommunity
as blacks,who are noisy,smelly,sexuallyunso theyshouldnotbe allowedto enterCanadaeither.19
andcriminal,
restrained
The above is a fairrepresentationof dominantsocial attitudesin Canada
untilwell into the 1950s. ManyCanadianswould contend that it is still an
accurate representationof their society's culturalvalues today, and some
would be willing to stop all furtherimmigrationof non-Europeans,indeed
to send not only immigrantsbut also some native-bornCanadians(particularlyblacks)"home."
Preservationof white and ChristianCanadianculture keeps the community close, and promotesthe security of its membersby not exposing
them to differentpeople with differentcustoms. As Michael Walzer has
stated:
[TMhe
policy[toone'scountry]... is notmerely
rightto choosean admissions
a matterof actingin the world,exercisingsovereignty,
andpursuingnational
interests.At stakehereis the shapeof the community
thatacts in the world,
exercisessovereignty,
andso on. Admissionandexclusionareat the coreof
communalindependence.
Theysuggestthe deepestmeaningof self-determination.Withoutthem,therecouldnotbe communities
of character,
historically
of menandwomenwithsomespecialcommitment
stable,ongoingassociations
to one anotherandsomespecialsenseof theircommonlife.20
Communitiesof characterwith a special sense of common life are a
morallyvaluable social good. To belong to a communitythat sharesyour
values, in which you feel at ease and in which everydaysocial intercourse
is based on commonly acknowledged rules and customs is to find social
life pleasant,ratherthanconfusingor shocking.Canadais a typicalWestern
society in so far as its immigrationis carefullycontrolledto maintainits
communityof characterin ways that, until very recently,violated international humanrightsnorms.
Canada has a long history of exclusion of non-white, non-Christian
immigrants.Immigrationpolicy has favored people of Britishor Northern

19. Thisis nota quotationbutmyown summaryof a positionwithwhich,obviously,Idisagree.
20. MichaelWalzer,Spheresof ustice:A Defenseof Pluralismand Equality(New York:Basic
Books,1983), 61-62.
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Europeanorigin.In 1914, a boatloadof Sikhsattemptingto immigrateinto
Canadavia Vancouverwas turned back.21 They were only one of many
groups historicallyexcluded. Chinese laborerswere importedinto Canada
to build the CanadianNational Railway,but once it was completed most
of them were deported,and those few who were permittedto staywere not
allowed to sponsortheirwives and childreninto the countryuntilwell after
WorldWarII.Canadadid not open its doorsto refugeeJewsduringthe Nazi
period.22Both non-citizen and citizen ethnic Japanesewere subjectedto
mass internmentduringthe SecondWorldWar.23
Afterthe war,about4,000
citizens of Japaneseethnic descent were deportedto Japan.24The Chinese
ImmigrationAct passed in 1923 in orderto stop Chinese immigrationwas
revoked in 1947,25 but the racial basis of Canada's immigration policy was
not fully eliminateduntil 1967, when a non-racialpoint system based on
wealth, occupation, education, and entrepreneurialabilitieswas adopted
for independentimmigrantsnot sponsoredby family membersalreadyin
Canada.By 1986 aboutfive percentof the residentsof Canadawere of nonEuropean,nonindigenousorigin.26
The resultof the new criteriaof immigrationintroducedin Canadain
1967 is that most non-whiteimmigrantsare quite well educatedand some
have higherpercapita
groups,such as Koreans,Japaneseand Indo-Pakistanis
incomes than some Euro-Canadian
ethnic groupssuch as Ukrainians,Portuguese,and Greeks.27These non-whiteimmigrants,knownas "visibleminorities,"certainlydo not conformto the previousimage of Canadaas a
whites-onlycountry(indigenouspeoples havingbeen regardedfor decades
as anomalousand irrelevant,if not inexorablydoomed to extinction).Yet
theiraspirationsandtheirlifestylesfitveryclosely with Canada'scommunity
of character.In most cases, the immigrantshad fully adopted so-called
"Canadian"valuessuch as hardwork,capitalaccumulation,and investment
in home and familybeforethey arrivedin the country.They are also eager
to adopt the Canadiansocial values of individualfreedom of choice in

21. TheCanadianEncyclopedia(Edmonton:Hurtig,1985), 2:948.
22. IrvingAbellaand HaroldTroper,None is TooMany:Canadaand theJewsof Europe19331948 (Toronto:Lesterand OrpenDennys,1983).
23. KenAdachi,TheEnemythatNever Was(Toronto:McClellandand Stewart,1976).
and the CanadianState,eds. Daniel
24. EllenBaar,"lssei,Nisei,andSansei,"in Modernization
Glenday,HubertGuindonand AllanTurowetz(Toronto:Macmillan,1978), 348.
25. E. B. Wickberg,"Chinese,"in The CanadianEncyclopedia(Edmonton:Hurtig,1985),
1:336.
26. Calculatedfrom StatisticsCanada, The Nation: Ethnicity,Immigrationand Citizenship
(CanadaCensus,1986) (Ottawa:Ministerof Supplyand ServicesCanada,1989), 1-1, 114. Europeanoriginscalculatedby addingsingle and mixedorigins.
27. ConradWinn, "TheSocio-EconomicAttainmentof VisibleMinorities:Factsand Policy
Implications,"in Social Inequalityin Canada:Patterns,Problems,Policies, eds. James
Prentice-Hall,1988),
Curtis,EdwardGrabb,Neil Guppy,and Sid Gilbert(Scarborough:
197. Databasedon 1981 census.
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occupation, religion, and politics. Aside from skin color, they are distinguishedfromEuro-Canadians
only by languageretentionby first-generation
and
some
immigrants
by
symbolic aspects of culturesuch as religionand
ritualbehavior.
Neverthelessthere has been a greatdeal of public hostilityin Canada
to the new non-white immigrants.Duringthe 1970s, physical attackson
Asian immigrantswere frequentlyreported;in Toronto,a Tanzanianwas
permanentlycrippledwhen he was pushed onto the subway rails.28In the
early 1980s, a majortelevision news programbroadcastan inflammatory
reporton how Chineseforeignstudentswere takingup an inordinatenumber
of places in the Universityof Torontomedical school; furtherinvestigation
revealed that all of the people filmed were Canadiancitizens of Chinese
ethnic descent. In 1989-1990, public ire was aroused by a proposalthat
Sikhs in the RoyalCanadianMountedPolice should be permittedto wear
turbans.Many Canadiansargued that to permitturbanswould attackthe
prized traditionof the red Mountiejacket and broad-brimmedhat, and a
petitionof over 125,000 signaturesopposing the change was presentedto
Parliament.Racistpins and calendarswere producedin the CanadianWest,
includingone calendarfeaturinga SikhMountiewiththe words"Sgt.Kamell
Dung"writtenon it.29The PrimeMinister'sstatementthat such objections
resembledthe behaviorof the KuKluxKlanannoyed manyCanadianswho
defended "tradition"while assertingthat they were not bigots.30
ThatCanada'sofficialnon-raciallybased immigrationpolicy arousesso
much hostility and opposition is not surprising.For many Canadiansof
Europeanextraction,communityof characteris possiblyonly among people
who sharethe same "racial"characteristics,if notas well the same (Christian)
religion.Ifcultureis an absolutesocial value, then those who kept Canada
closed to non-Europeanand non-Christianimmigrantsfor so long acted
ethically.Thosewho pressuredfor Canadato open its doors underminedits
cultureand were unethical.They should have recognizedthat immigration
threatenedCanada'sbasic social values, its very culture as a society of
descendants of Britishand NorthernEuropeanChristianimmigrants.The
introductionof liberal,non-racistsocial values into Canadianpublic policy
in the 1960s destroyedthis previousculturalunity.
Culturalabsolutismis the antithesisof humanrights.Positingcultureas
the highestsocial good, it permits,among many other human rightsviolations, the exclusion of outsidersfrom the pure and inviolablecommunity.
This contradictioncannot be resolved by makingthe false claim that all
28. "RacialAttacksConcernToronto,"CanadianNews Facts11 (19 Jan.1977): 1699.
29. "PrairieBacklash:Anti-minority
CampaignsCauseHeatedDebate,"Maclean's,19 March
1990, 18-19.
30. E.g.,threeout of five letterson thissubjectin TheSpectator(Hamilton,Ontario),28 March
1990.
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societies' systemsof social justice are systemsof humanrights,even when
they violate such basic tenets of human rightsas the principleof nondiscrimination.The belief that all systems of social justice are equally good
reflectsboth Westernromanticismof primitivesocieties, and a collective
social amnesiaregardingthe nefariouseffectsof romanticcommunitarianism
in recentWesternhistory.
Ill. RELATIVISM,
PRIMITIVISM,AND ROMANTICISM

In traditionalsocieties, principlesof social justice are based not on equal
human rights but on unequal social statuses and on the intermixtureof
privilegeand responsibility.Culturalabsolutistsreferto the existenceof such
traditionalsocieties to argue againstany presumeduniversalityof human
rights.Often anthropologicallyanachronisticpicturesare presentedof premodernsocieties, takingno accountwhatsoeverof changesthatmighthave
occurred. Picturesconstructedby anthropologistsof how societies might
have behaved "before the white man came" are presentedas accurate
descriptionsof how those societies still behave, decades if not centuries
later.Yetthe great anthropologistClaude Levi-Strauss
actuallyhad to persuade the remnantsof a tribe that he had set out to study to returnto the
bush with him, as they were just about to collectively join a Westernsettlement. Levi-Strauss
was obliged to persuadehis primitivecommunityto
his
research
stay primitive;
plans were upset by the conscious decision his
taken
of
had
to
modernize.31The use of anachronisticpictures
objects study
of "native"societies to illustrateso-called culturalprinciples"airbrushes
out" history.32
Westernersoften preferthat nativesocieties be unchangingbecause of
their belief that natives are their culturalancestors."Natives"representa
pure, idealizedstateof harmonyand peace to which, someday,Westerners
mightreturn.Inthese societies, humanrightsare unnecessarybecause conflict is unknown.The anxieties of moderncivilizationare not inevitable;
they are a contingentaccompanimentto modernitythatWesternersmay be
able to eliminate if they can find the true path back to communal living.
Yetthe ethnographicstudieson which culturalabsolutistsrelyarenotneutral,
anthropologistssympatheticto the cultures
objectivepictures.Contemporary
they study as are likely to overdrawtheir picturesas were their earlier,
arrogantlycolonialistforebears.Anthropologicalconclusionsbothaboutthe
31. Marianna
Torgovnick,GonePrimitive:SavageIntellects,ModernLives(Chicago:University
of ChicagoPress,1990), 181.
and
Literature
32. JamesClifford,ThePredicamentof Culture:TwentiethCenturyEthnography,
Art(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1988), 202.
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substance of culturalvalues and about the integrative,unchangingnature
of culturalnormsare drawnfromhighlyquestionabledata that reflectboth
the arroganceand the romanticismof Westernobservers.
Manyof these picturesof indigenousculturesare a right-sideup version
of what EdwardSaid has called Orientalism.By Orientalism,Said refersto
a pejorativeview of the "Orient,"or moreparticularly,of the MiddleEastern
Islamic world. In the Orientalistperspective,the presentationof Islamic
societies as unchanging,holisticentitiesis used pejorativelyto suggesttheir
incapacityto adaptto ethically superiormodernways.
unlikeany other[Western]
Islamis a unitaryphenomenon,
religionor civilization. .

.

. [It is] monolithic,scornfulof ordinaryhumanexperience, gross,

therearestillsuchthingsas an
reductive,unchanging.... [ForOrientalists]
arepresented
Islamicsociety,an Arabmind,an Orientalpsyche.... "Arabs"
in the imageryof static,almostidealtypes,and neitheras creatureswith a
potentialin the processof beingrealizednoras historybeingmade."
Culturalabsolutistsoften presentthe inverseof Orientalism,not a pejorative
picture of the societies they discuss but a complimentary,romanticized
picture. In so doing, however, they use the same idiom of unchanging
societies unaffectedby human history.And they often attributethese characteristicsto entiregeographicalregionsor religions,as if a culturecan be
completely identifiedby its location or its religiousbeliefs. Said comments
on this tendency to attributeculturalcharacteristicsto entire regionsof the
world.
"[Tihe Orient"is itself a constitutedentity. .

.

. [T]he notion that there are

whocan
inhabitants
radically"different"
spaceswithindigenous,
geographical
be definedon the basisof some religion,culture,or racialessenceproperto
thatgeographical
spaceis ... a highlydebatableidea.34
In academic discourse we no longer use racial stereotypes,yet in human
rightsdebates commentatorspersist in stereotypingall the inhabitantsof
non-Westerngeographicalregionswith the religio-culturalbeliefsthatthese
commentatorsbelieve mustdefine the non-Westerners'lives and dominate
theirthoughts.
ManyWesterners-explorers,anthropologists,culturally-sensitiveanalystsof humanrights--imposeon the "traditional"societies they encounter
their own desires to find a romantic,rusticoriginalstate in which social
harmonyprevails.This romanticizationof "backward"or "primitive"cultures is a right-side-upOrientalism,not criticizingbut idealizing.The ab-

33. EdwardW. Said, Orientalism(New York:VintageBooks, 1978), extractsfrom296, 299,
301, 321. Emphasisin original.
34. Ibid.,322.
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solutistdenial of universalhumanrightsrevels in the romanticmysticismof
primitivesociety.
The relativist[absolutist]... often definesthe interestsof a people in mystical

oraggregative
termsthatignoreorbelittleindividual
Suchmystical
preferences.
be
in
definitions
of
articulated
the
axiomatic
interests
form
"true"
ofpeoples,
may
as opposedto realor expressedinterests."
Culturalabsolutismthen is a spinoffof Westernprimitivism,the simultaneousidealizationanddenigrationof the "primitive"
thathascharacterized
Westernculturesince the mid-nineteenthcentury.Primitivismas an ideal
beganwiththe earlyEuropeanexplorationsto such remoteplacesas "darkest
Africa"where, it was thought,man was his true naturalself, at one with
nature."Primitivesare mystics, in tune with nature,partof its harmonies.
Primitivesare free."36Contemporaryidealizationof thirdworld culturesis
a new versionof that same trend.
Denial of the individualityof membersof these societies mergesthem
into one amorphouswhole, in which culturesare at riskof being destroyed
(forexample by introducingnew normsof humanrights)but actualpeople
are not. When the people who comprisethese romanticizedculturesare
considered not real individualswith their own needs, wants, and desires
but ratherliving anthropologicalexhibits, then their human rightscan go
unheeded.The primitiveby definitionis naturaland cannothavethe socially
constructeddesiresfor humanrightsthatWesternershave as refined,alienated social beings.The primitiveis not capableof abstractthought,of stepping out of her environsto considerthe natureof social life or the ethics of
her group. Thus to introducethe ideal of human rightseven into verbal
discoursewith a primitiveis to be an imperialist,to set off a processof social
change that may well wreck the indigenoussocial order.
That Westernersthemselves might once have been primitiveswhose
societies underwentcenturiesof social change is of no consequence here.
Those primitivesocieties that still exist are taken to be our psychological
ancestors.We need theirexistence,even when theirsocial organizationmay
well be exploitativeof, or cruel to, many of their membersso thatwe can
have a mythic past of purity.Theirorganicwholeness, their oneness with
nature,theirrepressionof individualchoice appealsto a Westerndesirefor
an imaginedsimplerworld. Primitivesare communitarians
par excellence,
unpollutedby ideas of individualismor competition.In theirsocieties, no
one questionsthe rules;everyone,even the lowliest, lives in harmonywith
othersand with authority.Thusthe appeal of the primitivenot only to left
romantics,but also to righttraditionalists.

35. Teson,note 10 above, 882.
36. Torgovnick,note 31 above, 8.
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IV.COMMUNITARIAN
VERSUSINDIVIDUALIST
PERSPECTIVES
ON SOCIETY
The culturalabsolutistcriticsof universalhumanrightslook for a worldthat
no longerexists, if it ever did: a world of community,of integrativemembershipof the individualin the group, and of a wholeness and unitywith
nature.Absolutists'defense of indigenousculturesagainstuniversalizedhuman rightsis to a largeextent a consequence of theirconcern that human
rightswill encourage the emergence of an individualized,atomistic,and
competitivesocial world. Absolutistsidealize the thirdworld community,
which exemplifiesfor Westernculturethe primitivearcadiawe have lost,
even as the thirdworld displayssome of the worst humanrightsabuses of
early modernization.
In the absolutistperspective,the preservationof the corporateentity of
the communitywill do more to preservehuman rightsthan introductionof
the principlethat the individualmay make claims againstsociety and the
state. This corporatecommunity,a productof over two hundredyears of
romanticreactionto the individualizingand liberatingtendenciesof modern
capitalistsociety, is completely unproblematic.In its romanticrendering,
internalinequities,power relationships,and brutalitiesdisappearin a foggy
haze of mythologicalcollectivity.The "traditional"way of life beckons to
ouranxiouscitifiedpsyches,remindingus all of the pristinecollectiveorigins
fromwhich we spring.
Individualslivingin primitive,pre-capitalistcommunitariansocieties are
not permittedto change or to think about what they would like from life.
Certainly,they are not permittedto deny our dreamof Utopiaby adopting
Westernartifactsor ideas.TheTasadayof the Philippines,forexample,were
accused by anthropologistsof being fake primitiveswhen they startedto
Ina similarvein, the contemporary
wearbluejeansandeat cheese crackers.37
primitivesof thirdworld societies are not permittedto be attractedto, to
adoptoradvocate,individualistidealsof personalautonomyor humanrights.
Thoseindividualsfromthe thirdworldwho do expresssuch ideasarequickly
dismissedas "Westernized;"that is, as unauthentic,offendingour view of
the psychological role they play for us. "[Ilt is critical to realize that the
Western-basednotionsof humanrights,to the extentthattheyare articulated
by thirdworldpoliticalelites, reflectthese elites' 'Westernization.'
"38While
we value intellectual independence in our own traditionwe refuse it to
intellectualsin others;they are supposedto be conservativeexemplars,not
radicalchallengers,of theirown traditionalvalues.
The anti-individualist
trendof the traditionalistnostalgiafor community
37. Ibid.,259 n.58.
38. Pollisand Schwab,note 4 above, 12.
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harborsa romantictendencyto ignoreor disguisethe many repressiveand
harmfuleffects(froma humanrightsperspective)of communitarian
societies.
This nostalgic discourse pits the allegedly alienated individualismof late
twentiethcenturycapitalistsociety againstthe supposed securityand personal rootednessof life in the collectivity.It ignoresthe liberatingaspects
of individualismandforgetsthatcollectivitiescan be highlyoppressivesocial
entities.
and individualistshave radicallydifferentperspectives
Communitarians
on the value of social life in the two types of societies. Those who favor
communitariansociety value the fact thatwithin it one's ties are prescribed
by one's relationsto family and kin. Withinthat networkof ties, sex and
age roles are carefullydefinedand androgynouslife choices (steppingover
the boundariesof male andfemaleroles)unheardof. Devianceis universally
abhorthe fact thatin individualist
abhorredand punished.Communitarians
is
contrast,
society, by
androgyny permittedand "lifestyle"choices that
offend the naturalorder of kinshipand family are tolerated.In the communitarianperspective,individualistswho rejectfamilyties have no other
ones and consequentlyfeel anomie-a disconnectionfrom society-and
normlessness.
In the communitarianperspective,socially-prescribedroles, freelyfulfilled,are assumedto resultin rootednessin society.Suchrootednesscannot
exist for the presumablyalienatedWesternindividual,who experiencesthe
confusionof havingto make autonomouschoices about how to live his or
her life. Individualistsociety exhibits a free-for-alltoleranceof disruptive,
anomic deviance which carrieswith it a disregardfor the actual consequences of deviant acts. The individualistadriftin a sea of normlessness,
casting about for new rules to regulatehis life, is confused and alienated
from society, while his communitariancounterpartis firmlyrooted in his
social group.
social stratificationis a sensibleallocationof roles.
Forcommunitarians,
Althoughhonor is based on rank,there is no shame attachedto those who
are slotted into lesser positionsas long as they fulfiltheir prescribedtasks
with diligence. Caste distinctionsare acceptable and all castes, including
slaves, cooperatefor the greatergood of the whole community.Thusthere
is an underlyingequality of respect. In individualistsociety, by contrast,
those inherentlydeservingof respect, such as the aged or the priestsand
lawmakers,are frequentlydenied it. Ascribedcaste distinctionsgive way to
unpredictableclass distinctionsarisingfrom unregulatedcompetitionfor
wealth and prestige;the "fittest"dominateby ignoringtheirobligationsto
others.The social whole breaksdown into an anarchicalsystem, in which
neitherrespectnoreconomic securitycan be guaranteedeven to those who
dutifullyfulfiltheirobligationsto family,kin and society.
Thus individualism challenges the routine and valued orderliness of
communitarian society. Upstarts abound, people abandon their social roles,
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honor disappears.Quiet communitarianlife gives way to normativeand
social chaos.
In the communitarianview, the underlyingglue that holds society together is its culture.The culturetends to be static and orderly;very little
change is foreseen. One's primaryidentitycomes fromone's familyor kin,
then from largersocial structuressuch as one's unchanginggroup, defined
as ethnic, religious,or national.Thereis no social conflictwithinthis group;
rather,everyone accepts its rules and roles. Implicitly,the communitarian
view denigratessocial deviance and the steppingoutsideof social rolesthat,
for example, women's liberationand the black civil rightsmovementhave
permittedin the Westernworld. Instead,it is assumed that contentedness
comes from fittinginto the group. It is also assumedthat membersof such
closed corporategroupscan and do live togetherin mutualtolerancewhen
not rentby the selfish claims of individualisticdeviants.
The individualistview of the antithesisbetween communitarianand
individualistsocietyis quitedifferent.Itstressesthe repressive,discriminatory
featuresof the ideologized communitariansociety. In its view, prescribed
family and kin ties are repressiveor, indeed, demeaningand violent, as in
the case of patriarchalviolence against women and children. The social
individual,therefore,ought to be free to choose other social networksthat
may be more importantto her thanfamilyor kin. In individualistsociety no
one is lockedintotraditional,prescribedsocial roles:sex rolescan be ignored
and deviance fromtraditionalways of life is permitted.
Individualistsperceive the belongingnessof closed social groups to
encourageracialor ethnic exclusivism,while a moreopen society encourages realtoleranceof otherswhatevertheirracial,ethnicor otherascriptive
affiliations.Inindividualistsociety, a personmustforman autonomoussense
of herself,which may or may not resultin a conscious decision to obey the
social normsprescribedby tradition.Individualachievementis celebrated,
while categorizationof people on the basisof nonautonomoustraitshaving
nothingto do with personalachievementis viewed as degrading.
In the individualistworld, respect must be earned;one is not entitled
to it merely by virtueof one's rank.Shame is just as much a characteristic
of communitariansociety as honor;to be respectedbecause one fills one's
lowly positionwithoutcomplaintis in factto sufferfrompermanentdishonor.
No hierarchiesof statusexist in the individualistworld; indeed, there are
no inherentstatuses at all. The unhealthysocial regulationof traditional
society is replaced by a healthy competitionin which the best rise to the
see social uniformity
top solely on the basisof theirown efforts.Individualists
ofcommunitariansocietyas repressive.Thusinthe individualistview, change
permitsdiversity,the rise and fall of individualsas their capacitiesdictate,
the choice and evolution of new communitiesand new ways of living,the
end of all inherent status rankings. A society in flux is a society that is
progressing.
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These schematizedideal types do not representreal societies. Individualistsocietiescontainmanycommunitarian
features.Andas communitarian
societies change, they approachthe individualistmodel in cultureas well
as in politics and economics. Both in practiceand in theory,we need to
reconcile the communitarianand the individualistaccount of society. The
communitarianaccount is too criticalof the breakdownof communityand
tends to referbackto romanticizedmodels, while the individualistaccount
is too uncriticalof the costs of individualism.The polarizationof these two
accounts of ideal society preventsdiscussion of the human rightsabuses
thatexist in bothand thatan uncriticaldefenseof "culture,"whetherclosed
and traditionalor open and competitive,can generate.
V. CULTURAL
AND THECONSERVATIVE
REACTION
ABSOLUTISM
The absolutistcritiquetrumpetsthe rightto communityover individualhuman rights,but only for people in other societies for whom criticaland
abstractthought is unauthentic.Thus in the culturallydifferentiatedthird
world the individualloses her capacity to claim fulfillmentof her human
rightsfrom the state or society; she renounces her human rightsfor the
greatergood of the collectivity.This renunciationis costlessto her because
her identityis mergedwith that of the group, so that human rightson an
individualbasiswould seem notonly irrelevant,butlaughable.She is merged
withherfamilyandsociety inan organiconenessthatfulfillsbothhercreative
and her social needs. And of course, since in this renderingshe eitherdoes
not live in a stateor class society or is untouchedby the state'sor the ruling
class' politicaland economic interests,she is entirelywithoutneed for the
classic civil and political rights.
In the communitarianview of individualistrights-protectivesociety,
autonomyis seen as alienation. Pollis, for example, refersto the Western
view of man as an "isolated,autonomous"creature.39
Autonomy,however,
does not necessarilymean alienationfromthe community.Autonomydoes
mean that the individualmakes decisions for herselfand may well refuse
socially prescribedroles in favor of other roles that seem preferable.The
autonomousindividualinWesternsocietyisfrequentlyone who is connected
to the communitythroughfreely chosen associationsand friendships,as
well as throughcontinued familyties. Autonomouslyformedgroups,subcultures,and neighborhoodsabound in Westernculture.The autonomous
individualis not necessarilyan alienatedindividual;she can ratherbe the

39. AdamantiaPollis,"Liberal,Socialistand ThirdWorldPerspectiveson HumanRights,"in
eds. PeterSchwaband AdamantiaPollis(New York:
Towarda HumanRightsFramework,
Praeger,1982), 7.
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"publicman [person],"activelyinvolvedin the communityand participating
in politicaldecisions.40 The decline of publics into masses, or the transformationof independentcitizens into manipulablerobots,is not a necessary
consequence of individualism.
Thisdoes not mean thatthe tension between individualand community
does not need to be examined.The unbridledindividualismand materialism
thatbecame characteristicof some sectorsof the NorthAmericanpopulation
in the 1970s and 1980s is an antisocial phenomenon. It is not accidental
thatthe worstexcesses of individualismarefoundin the UnitedStates,where
economic humanrightsin particularcarryvery littleweight. The cultureof
late twentiethcenturyNorthAmericacelebratesfreely-chosen,individualistic lifestyles.But "lifestyles"can be a matterof choice only for those in
an economic positionto choose; formanyif not mostpeople, the substantive
realitiesof economic insecurityprecludeany capacityto choose a particular
individualiststyle of living even in Westernsociety.
While autonomyand choice free individualsfrom often abusivesocial
constraints,competitionresultsin a lack of responsibilityfor others.To base
respectsolely on whatis earned,ratherthanto respectpeople merelybecause
as human beings with thoughts,feelings, and souls they deserve respect,
casts many onto the dungheapof capitalism.The ideology of achievement
now permitssocietal disregardof those who have not achieved, or who
cannotachieve, given the historicdisabilitiesunderwhich they labor.While
communitiesthrivein manyareasof NorthAmerica,in otherareascollective
responsibilityfor social welfare has disappearedvia white flight,tax revolt,
and vulgardisplayof personalwealth.
Communityis destroyed in modern societies where the individualist
pursuitof wealth is the primarysocial value, and where the poor are systematicallydisregarded.The unbridledindividualismtypicalof some sectors
of the NorthAmericanpopulationis an indicationthathumanrightsare not
beingprotected.Modernsocieties can be communitieswhen the entirerange
of humanrights-economic, social, and culturalas well as civil and political-is respected.Inwealthy societies, such respectis certainlypossible in
practice,though it may be anathemicin principleto some sectors of such
wealthysocieties. Unbridledmaterialisticindividualismis a strongargument
fortakingseriouslythe economic humanrightsuponwhich (intheirrhetoric)
socialistand thirdworld countrieshave insistedin internationaldebate. But
it is not an argumentfor reducingautonomy, reimposingcommunitarian
controlsthat limit individualchoices, or eliminatingthe principlethat individualsmay make claims for their humanrightson society and the state.

40. RobertN. Bellah, RichardMadsen,William M. Sullivan,Ann Swidler,and Steven M.
Tipton,Habitsof the Heart:Individualismand Commitmentin AmericanLife(New York:
Harperand Row, 1985).
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Argumentsfor the absolutevalue of cultureand for the importanceof
the petrifiedcommunityover the individualresultin politicalconservatism.
The culturalabsolutistapproachto human rightshas real political implications. If we are to accept that the communityis more valuablethan the
individualand thatculturemustbe preservedeven at the expense of human
rights,then we mustdiscuss the questionof priorities.When, as frequently
happens,communitynorms, rules, or desires clash with individualrights,
whatwill takeprecedence?The new communitarianism
likesto pretendthat
these clashes do not occur, but they do. Communitarianism
denies the
existence of status degradationand oppressionwithin all societies. The
romanticizationof "primitive"and "traditional"societies by relativistand
thirdworldistcriticsexacerbatesthis trend.
The romanticcommunitarianismthat some Westernabsolutistsnow
propoundas a legitimateargumentagainst individualhuman rightsalso
ignoresthe Westernworld's own history.In 1993, we are fewer than fifty
the world has
years pastthe worstexcesses of romanticcommunitarianism
ever seen. NationalSocialismglorifiedthe collectivityover the individual,
andbuiltup a mythof a pre-Christian
(non-Judaic)
pastin which;supposedly,
a communityof Aryanbeings lived in close communionwith nature."In
the beginning,the 'New Order'appearedas an instantsolutionto the quest
of the massesfor social dignityand a renewedcommunityspirit."41Nazism
epitomized the underlyingtendencies of Westernculture to retreatfrom
secularism,liberalism,and humanisminto a romanticizedpast of order,
stability,unchangingsocial roles, and complete social homogeneity.
The [romantic]GermanWeltanschauung
... [was]a total view of the (natural
and social) world, fundamentallyin conflictwith the essentiallyhumanistand
rationalistthoughttypicalof the restof Westerncivilization.... [The]personal
"individualism"
of the early Romanticsvery soon became transformedinto an
organicand nationalistictheoryof community,each uniqueand self-sufficient,
accordingto which . . . the individualwas "fatedto mergewith and become
rootedin natureandthe Volk"andwouldthusbe "ableto findhisself-expression
and his individuality."
Moreover,individualitywas ascribedno longermerely
to persons,but to supra-personalforces,especiallythe nationor the state.42

The revivalof romanticcommunitarianismwithout adequate considerationof its potentialforsocial corporatism,if not indeedrenewedfascism,
may well underminethe secularist,liberal,and humanitariantraditionof
human rightsthat has provided some protectionsto deviants, outsiders,
despised groups, and the oppressed over the past 200 years. The Nazis

41. ChristaKamenetsky,
"PoliticalDistortion
of Philosophical
Concepts:a CaseHistory-

Nazismand the RomanticMovement,"Metaphilosophy3 (July1972): 216.
42. Steven Lukes,Individualism(Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1973), 19-21. His quotationsare
fromG. L.Mosse, TheCrisisof GermanIdeology(London,1966), 15.
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murderedJewsbecause they regardedthem as modern,cosmopolitan,rootless slime.43They persecutedhomosexualsbecause they denied their prescribed sex roles and their obligationsto the Germanfamily, exhibiting,
especially duringthe WeimarRepublic, a free, autonomouslychosen, and
deviant lifestyle.44 They debated whether to preservethe Gypsies as ethnographicmuseumspecimensof the noble savageor to killthem as unauthentic half-breeds,finallychoosingthe lattercourse."4Inthe Nazi mind,Jews
and homosexuals epitomized selfish commercialismand individualism:
Gypsiessymbolizedthe worst impuritiesof contact between modernityand
the primitive.
There appearsto be a collective amnesia in the internationalhuman
rightsliterature,an unstatedagreementto no longerspeak of fascism. We
have forgottenthat fascist ideology was rooted in a romanticnotion of an
abandoned communitarianpast. We now prefer to dwell only on the
"good"-peaceful, loving, accepting, mutuallytolerant--aspectsof communitythat are relevantto the currentcritiquesof liberalism.Fascism,we
seem to believe, can't happen again; no contemporarysociety would turn
its communityinwardto the extent that the Nazis did.
Yet like the culturalunderpinningsof most other societies, the cultural
underpinningsof Westernsociety do not all favor human rights.Human
rightsare an ideal emanatingfromcertainstrandsof Westernpolitical philosophy,mainlyliberalismand social democracy.Thesestrandsin theirturn
are in part occasioned by social changes in the modern capitalistperiod
thatgeneratedsecularismand humanism.The politicallydominantcultural
values of some Westerncountries may possibly mesh with the values of
human rightsin the 1990s, afterforty-fiveyears of pro-humanrightspropagandaand some real progressin law and practice. Buteven in the West,
the values of human rightsare tenuous and fragile.A far strongercase can
be made that humanrightsare not the dominantWesternculturaltradition
thanthatthey are.TheWesternphilosophicaland culturaltraditionsof social
justice include not only liberalism,but also communism,corporatism,racism, and fascism.
The absolutistperspectivemeshes culturewith traditionand with the
past. It ignoresthe existence in the thirdworld of disparatepoliticalregime
types and the repressivephilosophiesthatmanyespouse. Butculturesin the
twentiethcenturyare very much determinedby the capacities of political
elites to influencevalues throughthe educationalsystem,the mass media,

43. On Jews as slime, see ZygmuntBauman,Modernityand the Holocaust (Ithaca,N.Y.:
CornellUniversityPress,1989), 39.
44. RichardPlant,ThePinkTriangle:TheNazi WarAgainstHomosexuals(New York:Henry
Holt, 1986).
45. DonaldKenrickandGrattanPuxon,TheDestinyof Europe'sGypsies(London:Heinemann,
1972), 93.
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and political incorporation.We are not our ancestors,either our mythic,
pre-historicancestorsor our immediateones. Everyindividualand every
culturalgroup is now influencedby a centralstate apparatusadheringto
one or anotherpoliticalideology.To espouse culturalabsolutismas if these
politicalregimesdo not exist is, in effect,to espouse politicalrelativismand
to arguethat all regimetypes possess ethicallyequal "cultures"of human
rights.
Romanticcommunitarianismnow buttressesmany of the criticismsof
liberalindividualismmade by politicalregimeson boththe leftandthe right.
On the left,the discreditedcommunistcriticismof humanrightsas bourgeois
and individualistwas picked up in the 1970s by thirdworld spokespersons
who still sometimesarguethattheirtraditionalcommunitieshave no room
for individualclaims against society or the state. On the right,the 1980s
witnessed the spectacle of PresidentRonaldReaganof the United States
extollingthe virtuesof traditionalfamilylife. Althoughhis own life was one
of freewheelingdisregardfor his children,46he managedto indictliberalism
as the majorsocial force behind the Americandestructionof the family,
ignoringhow his own public policy measurescontributedto that destruction.47

Liberalismin NorthAmericais overly individualistic.Some aspects of
communityhave disappearedand some types of community,especially a
communityof whites and blacks, neverexisted. Butthese problemscannot
be rectifiedby recourseto the mythof a golden arcadianpast.Romanticizing
non-Westernsocieties as embodimentsof the values that we have lost, or
never had, does not solve our problems;it merelyobscurestheirs.48
Reliance on myths of communal living avoids discussion of serious
ethical questionsof how to ensurejustice in the contemporaryworld.That
much of the worldwas recentlysubjectedto Westernimperialismdoes not
mean that it is now exempt from internationalethical debate. Those who
workforchangewithintheirown societies,andthosewho sufferbothmodern
state-generatedbrutalityand traditionalrightsabuses, are done a disservice
by some Westerners'willingnessto dismisssuch sufferingas culturallyauthentic,thus imperviousto criticismfromothercultural(philosophical,political)traditions.
Seriouscriticalanalysis of the human rightsabuses that exist in nonWesternpartsof the world does not necessarilyimply imperialistpolicy
recommendations.To criticize anothersociety or politicalsystem because
46. Joan Didion, "Lifeat Court,"New YorkReviewof Books36, no.20 (21 Dec. 1989): 3
passim.
47. On how publicpolicy neglectsthe familyin the UnitedStates,see SylviaAnn Hewlett,A
in America(New York:WarnerBooks,1986).
LesserLife:the Mythof Women'sLiberation
48. On how we neverhad some of thesevalues,see PeterLaslett,TheWorldWeHave LostFurtherExplored,3rd ed. (London:Methuen,1983).
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humanrightsabusesare intrinsicto its practicesis not to advocatethatone's
own society should thereforetake it over and rearrangematters.Contemporaryhumanrightsadvocatesare not the equivalentof nineteenth-century
Christianmissionaries;thattheir principlesare sometimescoopted by selfservingpoliticalrhetoricdoes not mean thatthey are the de facto agentsof
their governments.Nor does ethical criticismof a society, whether one's
own or others',imply that one regardsall of its cultureas unworthy.Many
humanrights-abusivepracticesthatdo exist are not intrinsicto the culture;
ratherthey are consequences of economic or political interest.
Many critics of universalhuman rightsfrom less-developed societies
want to preservetheir social values and are afraidthat human rightswill
underminethem. Butmany aspectsof culture,such as kinshippatterns,art,
or ritual,have nothingto do with humanrightsand can safelybe preserved,
even enhanced, when other rights-abusivepracticesare corrected.These
include many aspects of public morality.The existence or abolitionof polygynousmarriage,for example, is not an internationalhumanrightsissue,
despite feminist objections to it in the West. Nor is the properdegree of
respectone should show to one's elders, or the propernormsof generosity
and hospitality.The apparentWesternoveremphasison workat the expense
of family is a culturalpracticethat thirdworld societies can avoid without
violatinghumanrights.Manyother such matters,such as whethercriminal
punishmentshould be by restitutionor imprisonment,or whether homosexualsshouldhavethe rightto ordination,can be resolvedwithoutviolating
internationalhuman rightsnorms.
Culturalabsolutismforgivescruelty on the groundsthat acting in accordancewith the customsof one's own groupis a universalmoralprinciple.
The actual values of variousgroupsare broughtto our attentionwhen they
seem to be universally"good,"as in Renteln'shighlightingof tendenciesto
limitretributionin small-scalesocieties, even thoughprincipleduniversality
is rejectedandonly additiveuniversalityis accepted. Butwhen the principles
of such groupswould seem to be "bad,"when they condone denial of food
to the weak or denial of respectto those rituallyimpure,they are ignored.
Thus can non-Westernsocieties be romanticized.In our longing for the
good, we overlook evil, and claim we are doing so in the name of nonimperialistrelativism.Cultureis the absolutevalue, and individualsuffering
is lost in its embrace.
Culturalabsolutistsare the real ethnocentrists.They not only arguethat
no one's sense of justice can transcendthe boundariesof her own culture,
they also argue that one ought not to transcendthem. When dealing with
the underdevelopedworld, abstractdiscussion of norms of human rights
thatdo not reflectone's culturalembeddednessis a formof culturalbetrayal.
Nevertheless, the West is expected to adhere to such abstract notions when
in contact with the rest of the world. It is expected to compensate for its
past colonial depredations, act in a non-racist manner both in its international
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and its domestic politics, and respect others' cultures. This is a double
standard.Culturalabsolutistsapplaudethnocentrismin underdevelopedsocieties, yet they expect the Westto behave in ways thatrespecthumanrights
and therebydo not adhereto its own culturalnorms.And they considerthe
standardsof humanrightsto which some Westernersand some thinkersand
activistsfromthe thirdworldwant theirown society to adhereto be cultural
impositionsor imperialism.This denies to citizens of the underdeveloped
world the rightto use their reasonto considertranscendentethical norms
which, if implementedin theirown societies, mightwell resultin the bettermentof theirown lives.

